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TAXATION OF "BOOT" IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS:
RESOLUTION OF THE Wright-Shimberg DEBATE
Commissioner v. Clark,
109 S. Ct. 1455 (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
In a corporate reorganization, stockholders of an acquired corporation may re-
ceive stock of the acquiring corporation plus additional money or property, com-
monly referred to as "boot," in exchange for their stock in the acquired
corporation. The taxpayer may have realized a gain on the stock-for-stock ex-
change, but this gain is not recognized for tax purposes.1 However, if the taxpayer
realizes a gain on the non-qualifying consideration (the boot) he must recognize
the gain.2 Although the question arises whether to characterize the gain as ordi-
nary income or capital gain, characterization of the gain does not appear to be as
important after 1986 with the repeal of section 1202' from the tax code. Section
1202 accorded capital gains a preferential treatment in the form of a 60% deduc-
tion on gain from the sale or disposition of a capital asset.4 However, for reasons
to be discussed later in this note, characterization of gain as ordinary or capital
remains relevant. Until the United States Supreme Court decision of Commis-
sioner v. Clark,' the question whether to characterize boot as ordinary or capital
filtered through the federal circuits with different results. This note will outline
the various approaches of the circuit courts, discuss Clark's significance in resolv-
ing the issue, and explain the continuing relevance of the ordinary/capital distinc-
tion.
II. FACTS
Donald Clark, president of Basin Surveys, Inc. (Basin) from 1964 until April,
1979, owned all the outstanding shares (58) of Basin stock.6 N.L. Industries, Inc.
(N. L.), a publicly owned corporation interested in a possible acquisition of Basin,
made Clark alternative offers for his Basin stock.7 Clark was given an option to
exchange his Basin stock either for 425,000 shares of N.L. common stock or for
I. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1986). Unless otherwise specified the 1986 Code sections herein cited are identical
to the 1954 Code sections under which Clark was decided.
2. I.R.C. § 356(a)(l)(B) (1986).
3. I.R.C. § 1202 (1984).
4. Id.
5. 109 S. Ct. 1455 (1989).
6. Id. at 1459.
7. Id.
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300,000 shares of N. L. common stock plus $3,250,000.8 Clark agreed to the sec-
ond offer, and the transaction was consummated in April, 1979.1
In April, 1979, a forward triangular merger was completed in which Basin
merged with N.L. Acquisition Corp. (NLAC), an N.L. subsidiary founded to ef-
fectuate the acquisition.10 The gain on the exchange of Basin stock for N.L. stock
was not recognized for tax purposes since the transaction qualified under sections
368(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(D) 1 as a nontaxable reorganization. 2 A question arose,
however, whether to characterize the $3,250,000 cash boot, which is non-qualify-
ing consideration, as ordinary or capital gain. 
13
Clark reported the $3,250,000 on his 1979 tax return as capital gain.14 The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed with Clark's characterization of the
boot as capital gain1" and assessed a $972,504.74 deficiency against Clark. Clark
petitioned the Tax Court for review. The Commissioner argued that the boot had
the "effect of the distribution of dividend"16 and therefore was taxable as ordinary
income "to the extent of Clark's ratable share in Basin's earnings and profits." 7
The Tax Court unanimously held that Clark was entitled to capital gains treat-
ment. 18 The Commissioner appealed the Tax Court's decision to the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the Tax Court's decision. 19 The
Commissioner then appealed the Fourth Circuit's affirmation of the Tax Court's
decision to the United States Supreme Court. Agreeing that the $3,250,000 boot
was entitled to capital gains treatment, the Supreme Court affirmed.20
Ill. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The issue in Clark has been before several federal courts with differing results.
The United States Supreme Court was presented not only with conflicting deci-
sions of federal circuit courts, but also with an Internal Revenue Code open to nu-
merous interpretations as to when and how to tax boot. An understanding of the
conflicting federal decisions and the Code provisions involved is imperative to an
understanding of the Clark decision.
8. Id.
9. If Clark had accepted the 425,000 shares of N. L. stock, he would have held approximately 1.3 % of N.L.
common stock outstanding. Under the deal Clark accepted, the 300,000 shares represented .9290% of N.L.
outstanding common stock. Clark v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 139 (1986).
10. Clark v. Commissioner, 828 F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir. 1987).
11. I.R.C. § 368(a)(I)(A) (1986).
12. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1986).




17. Clark, 828 E2d at 223 (4th Cir. 1987).
18. Clark, 109 S. Ct. at 1459.
19. Id. at 1461.
20. Id. at 1466.
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A. The Code
1. Section 301 - Distributions
The Clark Court focused on the language of section 356(a)(2) which provided
that boot would be taxed as ordinary income in a reorganization if the exchange of
stock and boot had "the effect of the distribution of a dividend."21 To determine if
an exchange pursuant to a plan of reorganization had the effect of the distribution
of a dividend, a walk through the code sections dealing with distributions and div-
idends is helpful.22
Section 301 specifies that when a corporation distributes property to its share-
holders with respect to its stock,23 the portion of the distribution which constitutes
a dividend is included in the shareholder's income. 24 Section 316(a)21 contains a
two-part definition of dividend. If the corporation distributes property to its
shareholders out of its accumulated or current earnings and profits, the corpora-
tion has given a dividend to its shareholders. A distribution which comes out of
the corporation's accumulated 26 and/or current earnings and profits reflects the
corporation's success; 27 therefore, distribution is properly determined to be a divi-
dend upon which the shareholders must include in gross income since this divi-
dend reflects their share in the corporation's success.28 If, however, the
corporation has no earnings and profits, any distribution it makes cannot logically
be characterized as a dividend. Distributions of property by a corporation under
these circumstances more closely resemble a return of capital to the shareholders
and thus should not be includable in a shareholder's gross income.29
Determination of whether a corporate distribution is a return of capital or a div-
idend is geared to the existence of corporate earnings and profits .3 While not spe-
cifically defined in the tax code, 1 the concept of earnings and profits is important.
Section 312 of the tax code32 provides for certain adjustments to earnings and
profits but never specifies exactly what constitutes earnings and profits. Earnings
and profits are sometimes confused with, and used synonymously with, corporate
surplus; however, earnings and profits are not identical to surplus." If earnings
and profits were allowed to be determined as the amount of corporate surplus, the
21. Id. at 1462.
22. See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS §§
7.01-7.02 (5th ed. 1987) [hereinafter BITTKER & EUSTICE].
23. I.R.C. § 301(a) (1986).
24. I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (1986).
25. I.R.C. § 316(a) (1986).
26. Id.
27. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 22, at § 7.01.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 1.R.C. § 316(a) (1986).
31. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 22, at § 7.03.
32. I.R.C. §312 (1986).
33. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 22, at § 7.03.
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corporation could declare a stock dividend, which would deplete the surplus, and
then distribute cash tax free."
Earnings and profits have also been confused with the corporation's taxable in-
come,3 ' but sometimes non-taxable income is a valid addition to earnings and
profits.36 The rationale behind not finding a dividend where there are no earnings
and profits is to prevent a tax on a mere return of capital; however, because distri-
bution of income which is not taxable does not invade the corporation's capital,37
there is no correlative reason to exclude such income from earnings and profits.
2. Section 356- Reorganizations
Section 356 of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code governs the taxation of boot re-
ceived in corporate reorganizations. Section 356(a)38 provides that if, in addition
to stock which meets section 354 nonrecognition treatment, the taxpayer receives
nonqualified consideration, the taxpayer must recognize the gain, if any, and pay
tax on it, but not in excess of the value of the boot.39 The character of the gain is
determined under section 356(a)(2)4" which provides:
If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of the distribution of a
dividend (determined with the application of section 318(a)) [dealing with con-
structive ownership of stock], then there shall be treated as a dividend to each dis-
tributee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is not in
excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corpora-
tion accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain recog-
nized under paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property.4
If the boot did not have the effect of the distribution of a dividend, the recog-
nized gain will be treated as gain from the exchange of property capital gain if the
stock transferred would have been a capital asset in the shareholder's hands."2 If it
is determined that the boot had the effect of a dividend distribution, the gain on the
boot must be recognized as ordinary income up to each share's allocable portion of
the corporation's undistributed accumulated earnings and profits.' Any remain-
ing gain is treated as capital gain from the exchange of property." This is the "div-
idend within gain" concept of section 356(a)(2)." For example, if a taxpayer
realized a $500 gain on an exchange in which he received stock worth $250 and





38. I.R.C. § 356(a) (1986).
39. Id.





45. BirKER & EUSTICE, supra note 22, at § 14.34.
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ever, the taxpayer did not realize a gain because his basis in the stock he traded was
$500, then he will not have dividend income.4
Section 356 does not reveal the circumstances that would render boot as having
the effect of a dividend, but some courts have read this section as requiring that
pro rata distributions made pursuant to corporate reorganizations be taxed as divi-
dends if the acquired corporations had undistributed earnings and profits. 47 This
is the automatic dividend rule. 48 However, other courts have argued that section
356 does not expressly adopt this automatic dividend rule and that if Congress had
intended this construction it would simply have stated that all property accompa-
nying stock in a corporate reorganization is taxable as a dividend if the corporation
41had undistributed earnings and profits.
After the Tax Court decided Clark (but before the Supreme Court disposition),
the Senate Finance Committee proposed changes to section 356 which would clar-
ify boot characterization.50 The finance committee suggested that determination
of whether a boot distribution has the effect of a dividend should be made as
though the taxpayer received only stock in the exchange and then redeemed part of
it when the reorganization was completed. " Congress declined to adopt this revi-
sion and amend section 356 in the 1986 Tax Code. Congress had another oppor-
tunity to amend section 356 in 1987, but again did not do so. An explanation has
been advanced that with the repeal of section, 1202 in 1986, Congress did not
think that characterizing gain as capital or ordinary remained important.5 2
3. Section 302-Redemptions
Section 302 of the 1986 Code governs taxation of stock redemptions. Section
302(a) provides that if a corporation redeems its stock the redemption will be
"treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock" 3 as long
as 302(b)(1), (2), (3), or (4) applies.5 4 The corporation redeems its stock when it
exchanges property for its shareholder's stock.55 If the redemption does not com-
ply with 302(b)(1), (2), (3), or (4), then it will be taxed as a section 301 distribu-
tion 6 (i.e., the redemption will be taxed as a dividend 7 to the extent of the
46. Id.
47. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945); Shimberg v. United States, 577 F2d 283
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Commissioner v. Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1934).
48. See Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945) (taxpayer accorded dividend treatment because the corporation had
undistributed earnings and profits).
49. Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F Supp. 807, 809 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
50. S. REP. No. 47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
51. Id.
52. Knotts, The Characterization of Boot Distributions in Corporate Reorganizations After 1986, 66 TAXES 387,
396 n. 104 (1988).
53. I.R.C. § 302(a) (1986).
54. Id.
55. I.R.C. § 317(b) (1986).
56. I.R.C. § 302(d) (1986).
57. I.R.C. § 301(c) (1986).
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corporation's accumulated or current earnings and profits).8 Section 302(b) de-
scribes four situations in which redemption will be held to be a capital transaction
and, were it not for the repeal of section 1202, eligible for capital gains treatment.
Under section 302(b)(1), if a redemption is not "essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend"59 it will qualify for exchange treatment under section 302(a). 0 The Code,
however, makes no attempt to define in what situations a redemption will not be
equivalent to a dividend. The United States Supreme Court looked at this provi-
sion and held that if the stockholder experienced a "meaningful reduction" in his
proportionate interest in the corporation, the redemption could not have been
equivalent to a dividend; 1 however, there are no hard and fast rules which indicate
when a redemption will be held to have dividend equivalency. Because of the am-
biguity in the application of section 302(b)(1), it should only be utilized if the
other section 302(b) tests fail.62
Section 302(b)(2) has been cited as a "safe harbor" provision.63 The section
specifies that a redemption will receive exchange treatment under section 302(a)
if the distribution is "substantially disproportionate" to the shareholder64 and if the
shareholder owns less than 50 % of the corporation's voting stock immediately af-
ter the redemption. 6 Section 302(b)(2)(C) states that a distribution will be sub-
stantially disproportionate if the shareholder's post-redemption percentage of
voting stock is less than 80% of the shareholder's pre-redemption percentage of
voting stock.66 This test is an objective, mathematical test. If a redemption does
not satisfy the section 302(b)(2) provisions, it is not within the safe harbor and
must therefore qualify under one of the remaining section 302(b) tests. The sub-
stantially disproportionate language has been interpreted and applied in a number
of redemption cases. 67
58. I.R.C. § 316(a) (1986).
59. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (1986).
60. Id.
61. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313, reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970).
62. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supr note 22, at § 9.02.
63. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(A) (1986).
64. Id.
65. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B) (1986).
66. I.R.C. §302(b)(2)(C)(i)-(ii) (1986). An example of an application of the "substantially disproportionate"
standard appears in Treas. Reg. § 1-302-3(b) as follows:
Example: Corporation M has outstanding 400 shares of common stock of which A, B, C and D each own
100 shares or 25 percent. No stock is considered constructively owned by A,B,C or D under section
318. Corporation M redeems 55 shares from A, 25 shares from B, and 20 shares from C. For the re-
demption to be disproportionate as to any shareholder, such shareholder must own after the redemptions
less that 20 percent (80 percent of 25 percent) of the 300 shares of stock then outstanding. After the re-
demptions, A owns 45 shares (15 percent), B owns 75 shares (25 percent), and C owns 80 shares (26 2/3
percent). The distribution is disproportionate only with respect to A.
67. Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La. 1976), affd, 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979) (taxpay-
er's voting stock, reduced from 72 % to 49 %, was a substantially disproportionate distribution within the mean-
ing of§ 302(b)(2)); Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 E2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966) (a redemption of shareholder's
non-voting preferred stock did have dividend equivalence because taxpayer still owned controlling shares of vot-
ing stock and there was no substantially disproportionate reduction in his control of the corporation); see also
Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 E2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962).
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There are two remaining tests under section 302(b) which, if met, would confer
exchange treatment when the corporation redeems the shareholder's stock. Sec-
tion 302(b)(3) accords exchange treatment to the corporation's redemption of all
the shareholder's stock while section 302(b)(4) allows exchange treatment when
the redemption is made from a noncorporate shareholder in partial liquidation.
Neither of these provisions applies in Clark since Clark's interest in N.L. was not
totally terminated and since the redemption was not made pursuant to a partial liq-
uidation of N.L.
4. In Pari Materia Application of Sections 302 and 356
As a result of section 356's silence on when an exchange will have "the effect of
the distribution of a dividend," courts began to use section 302 redemption princi-
ples to determine whether an exchange in a corporate reorganization had the effect
of a dividend distribution. An early case, Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner,8
looked to section 302(b)(1) and recognized that "[w]hether the distribution of ac-
cumulated earnings 'has the effect of the distribution of a taxable dividend,' is
surely the same question as whether such a distribution is 'essentially equivalent to
the distribution of a taxable dividend.' ,19
Other courts, while not expressly stating that these two sections are read in pari
materia, have based their decisions on an assumption that the section 302(b)(2)
substantially disproportionate test can be applied to determine whether a distribu-
tion made pursuant to a corporate reorganization had the effect of a dividend dis-
tribution under section 356(a)(2).7"
The court in Idaho Power Co. v. United States,71 compared the "effect of the dis-
tribution of a dividend" language of section 356(a)(2) with the "essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend" language of section 302(b)(1). 72 Deciding that both provisions
were designed to prohibit distributions from being characterized as capital trans-
actions if they were in reality dividends,73 the court thus concluded that section
302(b) principles would apply in section 356 reorganizations. The court then held
that, in determining dividend equivalence under section 302(b)(1), if the share-
holder has substantially the same interest in the corporation after the distribution
as he had before the distribution, then the distribution is essentially equivalent to a
dividend.74 Applying the substantially disproportionate standard of section
302(b)(2) to the section 356 reorganization at issue in the case before it the Idaho
Power court found that the taxpayer's reduction in interest caused by the reorgani-
68. 155 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1946).
69. Id. at 24.
70. See Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956) (release from indebtedness in a corporate
reorganization resulting in taxpayer's receiving less stock from surviving corporation was not a reduction of in-
terest sufficient to render the transaction substantially disproportionate and therefore had the effect of a dividend
distribution).
71. 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Ci. 1958).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 809.
74. Id. at 810.
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zation was sufficient to avoid invocation of dividend equivalence.7" It is important
to note that for exchange treatment to be rendered under section 302(a), either sec-
tion 302(b)(1) or section 302(b)(2) would suffice. The court in Idaho Power used
the section 302(b)(2) substantially disproportionate standard to find that there was
no dividend equivalence under section 302(b)(1).
In Ross v. United States,7" the Court of Claims stated that "[tihe phrase 'has the
effect of the distribution of a dividend' in [section] 356 and its predecessor [section
112 of the 1939 Tax Code] is inpari materia with the phrase 'essentially equivalent
to a dividend' as used in [section] 302[(b)(1)] and its predecessor [section 115 of
the 1939 Tax Code]."77 The Ross court was the first to expressly state that
302(b)(1) and 356(a)(2) were to be read in pari materia.
In 1974, the Internal Revenue Service followed Ross by deciding that the sec-
tion 302(b) tests for characterizing a redemption as an exchange or as a dividend
may serve as guidelines for determining if a distribution had the effect of a divi-
dend distribution in section 356 reorganizations.78 Thus, there is authority for the
proposition that the section 302(b) tests may be utilized for determining whether a
distribution made pursuant to a corporate reorganization warrants exchange treat-
ment.
B. The Automatic Dividend Rule
In Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford 9 the United States Supreme Court had the
opportunity to interpret and apply section 112 (the 1936 Internal Revenue Code
equivalent to section 356) in its consideration of whether boot received in a plan of
recapitalization was taxable as capital gain or as ordinary income. Central to the
issue was whether the boot had the "effect of the distribution of a dividend." The
Court stated that a dividend is defined by statute as "any distribution made by a
corporation to its shareholders . . . out of its earnings and profits."8 The corpo-
ration which recapitalized in Bedford admittedly had earnings and profits in excess
of the amount of cash that it distributed to its shareholders. The Supreme Court
concluded that since the corporation had these earnings and profits the "cash
therefore came out of earnings and profits and such a distribution would normally
be considered a taxable dividend."81 Since "a distribution out of accumulated
earnings and profits is a 'dividend'. . . [it follows that] a distribution of earnings
and profits has the 'effect of the distribution of a taxable dividend'.. , The
75. Id.
76. 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959).
77. Id. at 797.
78. Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121.
79. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
80. Id. at 290-91 (quoting I.R.C. § 115(a) (1936)). See I.R.C. § 316(a)(1) (1986).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 292.
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Court therefore held that the boot received by the taxpayer was taxable at ordinary
income rates.83
Bedford has been cited by subsequent courts as the "automatic dividend" rule
because any time a distribution is made to stockholders pursuant to a corporate re-
capitalization or reorganization when the corporation had undistributed earnings
and profits, the distribution would have the effect of a dividend and thus not be
entitled to capital gains treatment.
1. Withdrawal from the Bedford Rule
Bedford has been severely criticized for various reasons by courts faced with
determining dividend equivalency in corporate reorganizations.84 One reason
courts have been reluctant to apply the automatic dividend rule is that it does not
allow the court to look into the motivation for the reorganization: The rule only
looks to whether the acquired corporation had earnings and profits.
In King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,8" which rejected the Bedford Court's
finding that dividend equivalency was automatically present where earnings and
profits existed,86 the court stated that "[t]he operative words of section 356(a)(2)
suggest a test of 'dividend equivalence', rather than a conclusion of automatic divi-
dend income merely because of the existence of earnings and profits .... "87 If
dividend equivalency was not to be found automatically upon the existence of
earnings and profits, courts would have to find an alternative method to determine
whether a boot payment would have the effect of a dividend distribution.
2. An Alternative to the Bedford Rule
An in pari materia reading of section 356(a)(2) and section 302(b)(2) would
render a boot payment as having the effect of a dividend distribution unless the
stockholder meets the safe harbor provision of section 302(b)(2). Therefore, for a
boot payment to receive exchange treatment, the taxpayer must own less than 50 %
of the voting stock and must meet the substantially disproportionate standard set
forth in section 302(b)(2)(C). If section 356(a)(2) is read inpari materia with sec-
tion 302(b)(1), a court will have to determine when a distribution is essentially
equivalent to a dividend before it can decide if a boot payment has the effect of a
dividend distribution. But, as has previously been stated in this note,88 the courts
are not clear as to how this determination should be made even though they agree
that they should look to the facts and circumstances of each case in deciding
83. Id.
84. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); King Enters. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct.
C1. 1969).
85. 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. CI. 1969).
86. Id. at 520.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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whether or not a distribution is equivalent to a dividend.89 Factors to which courts
look include the following:
The presence or absence of a bona fide corporate business purpose, whether the ini-
tiative for the distribution came from the corporation or from the participating
stockholders, whether earnings and profits were available for dividends and the prior
dividend history of the company, whether the transaction resulted in any substantial
change in the ownership or control of the corporation, whether the transaction was
the result of or resulted in a contraction of the corporation's business or narrowed its
activities, whether the distribution was substantially pro rata among the stockhold-
ers, and whether the stock acquired by the corporation was canceled and retired or
held as treasury stock. 90
The presence of all of these factors in one case is unlikely and, in fact, unneces-
sary. Some factors will weigh more heavily than others, but there is no clear-cut
test for how many of the factors must be present for a finding that there is no divi-
dend equivalence. The "net effect" of the factors will be considered. 91 For exam-
ple, courts have held that a bona fide business purpose is insufficient, absent other
factors, to insulate the stockholders from receiving dividend treatment. 92
One factor which does weigh heavily in determining whether a distribution is
equivalent to a dividend is the stockholder's interest in and control of the corpora-
tion after the reorganization.93 Since the purpose of a statutory reorganization is to
allow a stockholder to retain a continuing interest in the post-reorganization enter-
prise, "[a]n important indicium of equivalence of a payment to a dividend is
present if, after the exchange of stock and the payment, the shareholder still has the
same or substantially the same interest in the corporation after the payment that he
had before."94
C. The "Meaningful Reduction" Test
In stock redemption cases, courts have consistently held that if a redemption of
stock results in a meaningful change in the stockholder's position in the corpora-
tion as compared with the other shareholders, then the money he has received is
not equivalent to a dividend. 9' If the stockholder does not experience a significant
89. Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) (involving a redemption). See Ross v. United States, 173
F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (in deciding dividend equivalence in a reorganization the court must look to "all
the facts and circumstances surrounding the distribution to appraise the consequences of the transaction"); Treas.
Reg. § 1.302-2(b) ("[tlhe question whether a distribution in redemption of stock of a shareholder is not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1) depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case").
90. United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1958).
91. United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
92. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970); Bradbury v. Commissioner,
298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962); Carey, 289 F.2d at 538; Fewell, 255 F.2d at 500.
93. Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F2d 646, 648 (Ist Cir. 1949) (citing Darrell, The Scope of Commissioner v.
Bedford's Estate, 24 TAXES 266, 272 (1946)).
94. Idaho Power, 161 F Supp. at 810.
95. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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reduction in control of the corporation, then a stock redemption more closely re-
sembles a dividend.96
In United States v. Davis97 the United States Supreme Court stated that "to qual-
ify for preferred treatment under [section 302(b)(1)], . . . a redemption must
result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the
corporation."98 In this case the Supreme Court looked at a redemption of prefer-
red stock and refused to give the taxpayer capital gains treatment because the re-
demption did not reduce his proportionate interest in the corporation.99 Under
Davis when a corporation redeems stock from a sole shareholder, the redemption
will be taxed as a dividend to the extent that there are earnings and profits.100 Sec-
tion 302(b)(1) will not, therefore, apply in these cases. But the Davis Court did
not render section 302(b)(1) totally useless; it recognized that where a taxpayer
experiences a meaningful reduction in his proportionate interest, he may utilize
section 302(b)(1).101 Therefore, if there is more than one shareholder in the cor-
poration and if a corporate redemption reduces his interest in the corporation dis-
proportionately, the shareholder may be protected by section 302(b)(1) if the
reduction was meaningful.
The taxpayer in Davis retained full control of the corporation since he owned
all of the voting stock. 102 Since he owned over 50% of the voting stock and did not
experience a substantial reduction in the corporation, he also could not qualify for
the "safe harbor" provision of section 302(b)(2).10 3
1. The Step Transaction Doctrine
The meaningful reduction test of Davis has been applied by the courts with dif-
ferent, sometimes conflicting, results.104 Confusion was compounded when the
courts sought to apply the test in corporate reorganizations. The problem arose as
to when the test should be applied. 10
96. Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir. 1966).
97. 397 U.S. 301, reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970).
98. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
99. Id. The taxpayer was the sole shareholder in this corporation after application of the section 318 family
attribution rules. Since the corporation had earnings and profits in excess of the amount redeemed and since the
taxpayer was the sole shareholder, the court held that any redemption would have the effect of a dividend distri-
bution. Id.
100.Id. at 307.
101. Id. at 313.
102. Id.
103. This provision is commonly referred to as a "safe harbor" provision since preferred tax treatment is ac-
corded when the tests of 302(b)(2)(C) are met.
104. See Morris v. United States, 441 F Supp. 76 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (taxpayer with 50% of voting common
stock redeemed his non-voting preferred stock and was held to have experienced a meaningful reduction since he
no longer had the right to his 5 % of par value of stock yearly dividend, which was payable even before corporate
officers and management had received their salaries); Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La.
1976), affd, 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979) (applied the meaningful reduction test and decided that taxpayer was
entitled to capital gains treatment since his voting stock ownership was reduced from 72% to 49%).
105. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d. 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (holding
that the test is applied before the reorganization); Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding
that the test is applied after the reorganization is complete).
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One pre-Davis court held that, in determining tax consequences in corporate
reorganizations, the entire transaction should be viewed as a unified whole. 10 In-
stead of looking at each step in the reorganization separately and defining the tax
consequences on each step, the steps must be viewed as parts of an integrated
transaction. 0 7 The step transaction doctrine recognizes that a transaction which
requires a number of steps is realistically unified, the tax should be assessed view-
ing the transaction as a whole."0 8 In determining whether boot has the effect of a
dividend distribution, section 302 principles apply to the entire transaction.
2. Post-reorganization Application: Wright v. United States
In Wright v. United States,' the taxpayer owned controlling interest in three
corporations: Danco Construction Co. (Danco), F & G Construction Co. (F &
G), and World Wide, Inc. (World Wide). 0 The taxpayer's business associate
owned shares in Danco and World Wide, but not in F & G. "' The taxpayer and his
associate wanted to merge World Wide and F & G with each retaining the same
proportionate interest in the new corporation (to be named Omni Corporation) as
they each owned in Danco. "2 A pure stock-for-stock exchange would have given
the taxpayer 85 % and his business associate 10% of Omni common stock. In or-
der to keep the proportionate interest in Omni the same as in Danco," 3 the tax-
payer accepted 61.7 % of Omni stock and a $102,002 interest-bearing promissory
note issued by Omni. 4 The taxpayer's associate paid $7,005.57 to Omni and re-
ceived 27.8 % of Omni stock."'
Since the promissory note was boot within the meaning of section
356(a)(1)(B), the court had to decide whether to characterize the note as gain
coming from the exchange of property or as ordinary income if it had the effect of
a dividend distribution. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that to de-
termine if the boot had the effect of a dividend or if it was a sale, the note should be
viewed as a redemption of stock made before the reorganization. 1 16 A pre-reor-
ganization treatment would render the promissory note as having been issued to
the taxpayer by F & G. 7 Since under this interpretation the taxpayer's interests
106. King Enters. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See also Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d914(6th
Cir. 1954) (in a stock redemption court looked at the whole transaction and determined that since overall effect
was to extinguish taxpayer's interests in the corporation then the transaction was not equivalent to a dividend);
Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113 (affirming Zenz approach of looking to overall transaction).
107. King Enters., 418 F.2d at 516.
108. Id.
109. 482 F2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
110. Id. at 602.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. The taxpayer owned 71.5 %, and his associate owned 27.9 % of Danco. The remainder was owned by the
taxpayer's attorney.
114. Wright, 482 F.2d at 603.
115. Id. The remaining 10.5% was owned by taxpayer's wife, mother, and attorney.
116. Id. at 606.
117. Id.
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would only have been reduced from 99.16 % to 95.43 %, this would not constitute
a substantially disproportionate distribution under section 302(b)(2)(C).
The court viewed the pre-reorganization analysis as artificial because it failed
to recognize that a reorganization had taken place.l18 The court stated that "[t]he
issuance of the note was part of an entire corporate reorganization based on the
capital accounts of both F & G and World Wide." 19 The court further stated that
"the note was issued by Omni in exchange for a portion of Omni stock that the tax-
payer would have received if he had taken Omni stock entirely instead of receiving
Omni stock and a note issued to him by Omni."12 Applying a post-reorganization
analysis, the court recharacterized the single reorganization into two transactions:
(1) a reorganization in which "stock" replaced the boot actually received by the
shareholder and (2) a redemption of the "stock" in exchange for the boot re-
ceived.121 The court then applied the redemption rules of section 302 to the hypo-
thetical redemption. 22
The Wright court decided that the 23.3 % reduction was a meaningful reduction
and, therefore, should be taxed at capital gains rates. Even though the taxpayer
still owned over 50% of the voting stock, taking the transaction out of the section
302(b)(2) safe harbor provision, the court still found that the taxpayer was entitled
to capital gains treatment since he experienced a meaningful reduction and, there-
fore, qualified for exchange treatment under section 302(b)(1). 23 The court
viewed the transaction as more closely resembling a sale rather than a dividend be-
cause the taxpayer "relinquished valuable rights in the future business. "'124 Specifi-
cally, the taxpayer after the reduction could no longer unilaterally make certain
corporate decisions -decisions to amend the articles of incorporation, to merge or
consolidate, or to liquidate -because under Arkansas law (the place of incorpora-
tion) a 2/3 vote would be required for such corporate action.125
3. Pre-reorganization Application: Shimberg v. United States
In Shimberg v. United States, 126 the taxpayer owned 66.8 % of LaMonte-Shim-
berg Corporation (LSC). 127 LSC entered into a type A merger128 with MGIC In-
vestment Corp. (MGIC).129 Pursuant to the merger agreement LSC stockholders
received MGIC stock and cash. The taxpayer received 21,461 shares of MGIC




122. While this analysis is also artificial, it at least recognizes that a reorganization occurred.
123. Wright, 482 F.2d at 609.
124. Id. at 607.
125. Id. at 609.
126. 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
127. Id. at 284.
128. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A) (1986).
129. Shimberm, 577 F.2d at 285.
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stock plus $417,449 in exchange for his LSC stock.13 The taxpayer characterized
the boot as long-term capital gain, but the Commissioner determined that the boot
had the effect of a dividend distribution and was taxable as ordinary income.131
The taxpayer paid the deficiency assessed against him and brought a refund suit in
district court. 132 The district court compared the taxpayer's prior interest in LSC
(66.8 %) with his present, post-reorganization interest in MGIC (less than 1%) to
find that he had experienced a meaningful reduction and was therefore entitled to
capital gains treatment.
1 3 3
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's holding. 134 The circuit court was
concerned that the district court's holding would result in capital gains treatment
in all cases where a small corporation is merged into a large one.13 The circuit
court stated that "[a] contrary holding would render section 356(a)(2) virtually
meaningless when a large corporation swallows a small one in a reorganization,
for there will always be a marked decrease in control by the small corporation's
shareholders, unless the same shareholders control both corporations." 3 '
To determine whether the boot had the effect of the distribution of a dividend,
"dividend" must be defined. Section 316 of the Code defines dividend as "any dis-
tribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders . .. out of its
earnings and profits."' 37 A reorganization is "tax free" only if it meets the continu-
ity of proprietary interests in the continuing corporation test of Treasury Regula-
tion 1.368-1(b). Reading section 356(a)(2) as requiring a pre-reorganization
determination of whether the distribution was to be taxed as a dividend, the Fifth
Circuit stated:
If a pro rata distribution of profits from a continuing corporation is a dividend, and a
corporate reorganization is a 'continuance of the proprietary interests in the continu-
ing enterprise under modified corporate form,' it follows that the pro rata distribu-
tion of 'boot' to shareholders of one of the participating corporations must certainly
have the 'effect of the distribution of a dividend' within the meaning of [section]
356(a)(2).
13 8
Under the 356(a)(2) test the boot is treated as though it had been distributed in a
redemption prior to the reorganization. The Fifth Circuit therefore found that if
the distribution in Shimberg had been made prior to the merger it would have con-
structed a distribution of a dividend since the distribution was pro rata and outside
exchange treatment of section 302(a) and since LSC had undistributed earnings
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Both LSC and MGIC had undistributed earnings and profits exceeding the boot payment.
133. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 286.
134. Id. at 287-88.
135. Id. at 288.
136. Id.
137. I.R.C. § 316 (1986).
138. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288 (citations omitted).
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and profits in excess of the amount distributed. 9 The court was concerned that an
anomalous result would ensue if the taxpayer was required to pay ordinary income
rates upon receipt of a dividend distribution but would be entitled to a capital gains
treatment upon receipt of a distribution made pursuant to a type A merger. 4 '
Reading the legislative history of the predecessor to section 356(a)(2) as support-
ing its rationale,' 41 the court stated that a taxpayer should not be entitled to capital
gains treatment simply because he received his share of the distribution after the
merger instead of before.142
IV. INSTANT CASE
Adopting the pre-reorganization test of the Shimberg court, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue argued in Clark that the $3,250,000 boot Clark received
should be viewed as a redemption by Basin prior to the reorganization.' 1 Accord-
ing to this view the boot would have had the effect of a dividend since Clark was
the only Basin shareholder and any distribution would have been pro rata so that
Clark's proportionate interest in Basin would have been unchanged.'"
Clark argued that, instead of looking at the boot as a pre-reorganization re-
demption, the test should require "that one imagine a pure stock-for-stock ex-
change, followed immediately by apost-reorganization redemption of a portion of
the taxpayer's shares . .. in an amount equal to the boot.""14 If this view pre-
vailed, the boot would not have had the effect of the distribution of a dividend
since Clark would have experienced a substantially disproportionate reduction of
interest.1
4 6
The Court agreed with Clark's characterization of the boot as coming from a
post-reorganization redemption of N.L. stock.147 The Court stated that section
302 applied in determining whether the boot had the effect of a distribution of a
dividend but noted that section 302 applied to stock redemptions of single corpo-
rations and not specifically to stock redemptions made pursuant to a reorganiza-
tion between two corporations." Because of this, section 302 does not deal with
whether to treat the hypothetical redemption "as a pre-reorganization distribution
coming from the acquired corporation or as a post-reorganization distribution
coming from the acquiring corporation." 4 9 Because it recognized that the trans-
139. Id. at 289.
140. Id.
141. The legislative history was concerned with a deliberate creation of another corporation for the purpose of
routing earnings and profits into a new corporation and giving boot in addition to stock in the new corporation.
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 14-15 (1924) [1939-1 C.B. (part 2), 241,252].
142. Id.
143. Clark, 109 S. Ct. at 1459.
144. Id. at 1459-60.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1463.
148. Id. at 1461.
149. Id.
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action was integrated the Court thought it made more sense to view the transaction
as a post-reorganization redemption." 0
In supporting its view that the post-reorganization rationale should apply, the
court pointed to three ways that Congress indicated its approval of this rationale. 15'
First, section 356(a)(2) says that if the exchange has the effect of a dividend distri-
bution, it will be taxed as ordinary income."5 2 This language indicates that Con-
gress intended that the transaction be viewed as an integrated whole and not
separated into parts with the tax consequences determined on each separate
part. ' 3 Second, section 356 applies to property, non-taxable property under sec-
tion 354 or section 355, as well as other property taxable and "received in the ex-
change." This language indicates that the entire transaction, not just the property
which is not recognized for taxation, is to be viewed when determining whether
capital gains applies."5 4 Finally, the Court found that since "section 356 expressly
limits the extent to which boot may be taxed to the amount of gain realized in the
reorganization . . . Congress intended that boot not be treated in isolation from
the overall reorganization."'55
The Court stated that its finding is consistent with the step-transaction doc-
trine, which the government itself had adopted,5 6 where interrelated steps in an
integrated transaction were to be viewed together. Viewing the boot payment as
part of the overall exchange "acknowledges that there would have been no cash




Once the Court decided to use the post-reorganization approach as propounded
by Wright, it applied section 302 and concluded that Clark was protected by the
safe harbor provisions of section 302(b)(2). The Court characterized the boot as
N.L.'s redemption of 125,000 shares of its common stock. Had Clark accepted
the pure stock-for-stock offer, he would have owned 425,000 shares of N.L.
stock, giving him a 1.3 % voting interest in N. L. Since the transaction was to be
viewed as a post-reorganization redemption of N.L. stock, the distribution was
substantially disproportionate to Clark under section 302(b)(2) .18 Therefore,
Clark was correct in his assessment of the boot as a long-term capital gain.
Although acknowledging that the post-reorganization view was artificial be-
cause it "imagine[d] that the redemption occurred outside the confines of the ac-
tual reorganization,""'5 The Court also stated that this view should prevail over
the pre- reorganization theory. The post-reorganization view at least "recognizes
150. Id. at 1462.
151. Id.
152. Id.




157. Id. at 1463.
158. Clark's post-redemption percentage of voting stock was less than 80% of his pre-redemption percentage
of voting stock. For an example application of the substantially disproportionate standard see supra note 66.
159. Clark, 109 S. Ct. at 1464.
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that a reorganization has taken place, while the pre-reorganization approach re-
casts the transaction to the exclusion of the overall exchange."160
The Court further reasoned that in enacting section 356 Congress was con-
cerned with reorganizations that were designed to " 'siphon-off accumulated
earnings and profits at a capital gains rate .... "161 The Court stated:
This purpose is not served by denying capital gains treatment in a case such as this in
which the taxpayer entered into an arm's length transaction with a corporation in
which he had no prior interest, exchanging his stock in the acquired corporation for
less than a one percent interest in the acquiring corporation and a substantial cash
boot. 162
Justice White, the sole dissenter in Clark,'63 argued that since Clark was the
only Basin shareholder, any payment to him would have the effect of the distribu-
tion of a dividend because a payment to him would be pro rata. '64 He also argued
that Clark's retention of a proprietary interest in the continuing corporation was a
further indication that the boot was equivalent to a dividend. 16  White's conten-
tion was that by trying to abolish the automatic dividend rule, the majority had
imposed an automatic non-dividend rule which would apply even in pro rata distri-
butions. 66
V. ANALYSIS
The Clark decision is important for a number of reasons. Clark's resolution of
the circuit split will facilitate uniform application of the tax laws. Clark also con-
firms that the section 302(b) tests are to be used in deciding whether boot in a cor-
porate reorganization has the effect of a divided distribution. As the Clark Court
itself acknowledged, the post-reorganization view is somewhat artificial; how-
ever, by adopting it the Court made the more logical choice, given the alternative.
At first glance, it appears that Clark is of limited significance, given the repeal in
the 1986 tax reform of section 1202, which allowed a 60 % deduction of net capital
gains from gross income. This analysis will examine Clark's significance before





163. Id. at 1466.
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A. Commissioner v. Clark: "Wrightly"Decided
1. Confirmed In Pari Materia Application of Sections 302 and 356
Clark confirmed in pari materia application of section 302 and section 356,
thus rejecting Shimberg's refusal to apply section 302 to reorganization cases. , 6
This approach is more rational given section 356's silence on when boot has the
effect of a dividend. The Fifth Circuit approach in Shimberg would render section
356(a)(2) useless. Under the Shimberg approach, if earnings and profits existed in
the acquired corporation's shareholders, the boot would automatically be deter-
mined to have the effect of a dividend. The Shimberg Court argued that section
356 would be otherwise useless in all situations where a large corporation ac-
quired a smaller one because there would always be a reduction in interest where
the stockholders of the small, acquired corporation are concerned.168 However,
the Shimberg Court failed to consider that had Congress intended that section 356
be given the Shimberg Court's interpretation, it would not have framed section
356(a)(2) as an exception to the general rule that property accompanying stock in a
reorganization is recognized as gain. 169 The Supreme Court's acceptance of ap-
plying the section 302(b)(2) tests in determining whether boot has the effect of a
dividend in reorganizations will aid future courts faced with this decision.
2. Resolved Post-reorganization vs. Pre-reorganization Conflict
The Clark Court's decision to view the boot as a hypothetical redemption after
the reorganization had taken place is preferable to Shimberg's pre-reorganization
view. Under Shimberg, any pre-reorganization redemption would be a dividend to
the extent that the acquired corporation had undistributed earnings and profits.
The Shimberg court's insistence on using the pre-reorganization test stems from
its misunderstanding of the Wright post-reorganization test. The Shimberg court
interpreted the test as requiring a comparison between the stockholder's interest in
the acquired corporation with his post-reorganization interest in the acquiring cor-
poration. For this reason the Shimberg court stated that in "minnow-whale" reor-
ganizations the stockholders of the acquired corporation would always experience
a meaningful reduction.17 The test in Wright, however, was a comparison of the
stockholder's interest in the acquiring corporation that he would have had if he had
accepted only stock, with his interest in the acquiring corporation that he actually
had after accepting stock and boot.171
167. Id.
168. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288.
169. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1986) states that "fi]f an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of
the distribution of a dividend ...then there shall be treated as a dividend ...such an amount . . . as is not in
excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated ..
I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1986) (emphasis added).
170. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288.
171. Wright, 482 F.2d at 607.
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The Shimberg court was particularly concerned that a taxpayer should not re-
ceive preferential tax treatment simply because he chose to receive his share of a
distribution after the merger instead of before. The court cited the legislative his-
tory of section 356 in support.172 The legislative history, however, is concerned
with a deliberate creation of another corporation for the purpose of routing earn-
ings and profits into a new corporation and giving boot as well as stock in the
newly-created organization.173 In a situation such as this, the stockholders of the
old corporation retain the same interests in the newly-created corporation. This is
far different from a situation in which a stockholder has experienced a substantial
reduction in interest in the acquiring corporation.
As previously stated, the test of Wright is also artificial because it imagines a
hypothetical redemption of stock by the acquiring corporation after the reorgani-
zation has occurred. However, as the Supreme Court recognized in Clark, at least
this view acknowledges that the boot would not have been distributed without the
reorganization. If the step-transaction doctrine is to survive, the post-reorganiza-
tion analysis must prevail since it views the entire transaction as parts of an interre-
lated whole.
3. Provided Consistentcy with the Purpose of Section 356
The Clark Court's adoption of Wright over Shimberg is more consistent with the
purpose of section 356. Section 356 was designed by Congress to prevent corpo-
rations from purposefully bailing out earnings and profits at capital gains rates. 
174
When such a purposeful intent in siphoning-off earnings and profits is not present,
however, section 356 should not operate to deny capital gains treatment. The
method by which courts should determine whether a reorganization was entered
into for the purpose of bailing-out earnings and profits is to scrutinize the post-re-
organization situation of the stockholders. If the stockholder has retained rela-
tively the same interests in the new corporation even after the boot distribution as
he owned in the old corporation, then the distribution of boot looks more like a
dividend and should be taxed as such. If, however, the stockholder's interests have
been substantially reduced after the boot has been distributed, it is difficult to
172. Shimberg, 577 E2d at 289 n. 16.
173. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924) [1939-1 C.B. (part 2), 241, 252]. The House
Report gives the following example:
Corporation A has capital stock of $ 100,000, and earnings and profits accumulated since March 1, 1913,
of $50,000. If it distributes the $50,000 as a dividend to its stockholders, the amount distributed will be
taxed at the full surtax rates. On the other hand, corporation A may organize corporation B, to which it
transfers all its assets, the consideration for the transfer being the insurance by B of all its stock and
$50,000 in cash to the stockholders of corporation A in exchange for their stock in corporation A. Under
the existing law, the $50,000 distributed with the stock of corporation B would be taxed, not as a divi-
dend, but as a capital gain, subject only to the 12 1/2 per cent rate. The effect of such a distribution is
obviously the same as if the corporation had declared out as a dividend its $50,000 earnings and profits.
If dividends are to be subject to the full surtax rates, then such an amount so distributed should also be
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view the reorganization as a deliberate attempt to receive a dividend by concealing
earnings and profits in a capital exchange transaction in order to receive favorable
tax treatment.
In Shimberg, if LSC had intended a bail out, it does not seem likely that it would
have sought to accomplish this through a reorganization that left its stockholders
with less than 1 % voting interest in the surviving corporation. For this reason,
Wright is more consistent with section 356, and the Clark Court was correct in
adopting the Wright standard.
B. Clark's Importance After the 1986 Tax Reform
1. Remaining Statutory Distinction Between Capital Gains and Ordinary Income
in the 1986 Tax Code
The 1986 Tax Reform Act saw the exclusion of section 1202 from the 1986 In-
ternal Revenue Code. Section 1202 provided that individual taxpayers could de-
duct 60% of their net capital gain from gross income. 7 5 Although this specific
provision was eliminated from the Code, the other Code provisions which distin-
guished between capital gains and ordinary income remained intact.
Given the condition of the United States budget deficit, one reason which has
been advanced for the retention of the statutory distinction is that, Congress may
increase the tax rate on ordinary income. 76 If it does, special provisions for capi-
tal gains may be reinstated. 17 7 In fact, congressional intention in retaining the stat-
utory distinction between capital gain and ordinary income was "to facilitate
reinstatement of a capital gains rate differential if there is a future tax rate in-
crease."
178
If Congress determined that retention of the distinction was important because
of a likelihood that capital gains rates would be reinstated, Clark's resolution of the
boot taxation issue remains significant. Given the very real possibility that capital
gains rates will be reinstated, Clark should not be dismissed simply because capi-
tal gains are currently taxed as ordinary income.
2. Offset of Capital Gain by Capital Losses
Section 1211 of the 1986 Code provides that capital losses may be fully allowed
to the extent that there are capital gains. 179 This provision is important because
capital losses are not fully deductible from ordinary income. Capital losses may
be deductible from ordinary income only up to $3,000. 180 Allowing the taxpayer
to deduct capital losses from capital gains is beneficial, even though the capital
175. I.R.C. § 1202 (1984).
176. Faber, Capital Gains vs. Dividends in Corporate Transactions: Is the Battle Still Worth Fighting?, 64 TAXES
865,873 (1986).
177. Id. See also Gardner& Stewart, Capital Gains and Losses After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 65 TAXES 125,
129 (1987).
178. H.R. REP. No. 841,99th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-106 (1986).
179. I.R.C. § 1211 (b) (1986).
180. Or $1,500 when a married individual files a separate return. I.R.C. § 121 1(b)(2) (1986).
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gains are taxed at ordinary income rates. For example: if X has capital gains of
$100,000 and no capital losses, he must pay the same tax as if this were ordinary
income on the entire $100,000. If, however, X had capital losses of $50,000, sec-
tion 1211 (b) allows him to deduct this loss from his $100,000 of capital gains.
This would leave $50,000 of taxable income. If X had no capital gains, then he
could only deduct $3,000 of his capital losses against his ordinary income.
The Code's allowance of capital loss deduction from capital gains makes the
distinction between dividend and capital gains in boot distributions important. If
a court finds that boot had the effect of a dividend, this would be ordinary income
and only $3,000 of capital losses from other transactions can be deducted. Con-
versely, if the court finds boot to be capital gain, then capital losses from other
transactions are fully deductible up to the amount of the boot. Obviously, this
characterization of boot as capital gain results in less taxable income where the
taxpayer has experienced capital losses in other transactions. Though the capital
gain is taxed at the same rate as ordinary income, there is less to be taxed.
Because capital gains may be offset by capital losses, Clark's resolution of the
issue of when to apply the section 302 standard in corporate reorganizations is im-
portant.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Clark decision confirms the validity of using section 302(b) tests when de-
termining how to tax boot in a corporate reorganization. Clark resolves the con-
flict among the courts as to the method to be used for taxing boot. Clark clears up
the confusion and, therefore, aids more uniform application of the tax laws in re-
organization cases involving payment of boot. Even with the repeal of section
1202, Clark remains significant, since capital gains may be offset by capital
losses. Furthermore, future legislation may see the reinstatement of a capital
gains deduction.
Lisa Thompson Sykes
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